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THE CRITICAL CHALLENGES FROM
INTERNATIONAL HIGH-TECH AND
COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME AT THE
MILLENNIUM
MICHAEL A. SUSSMANN*
I consider high-tech crime to be one of the most serious issues
demanding my attention, and I am doing everything in my
power to ensure that the United States actively responds to
these challenges.
U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, January 21, 19971
I.  INTRODUCTION
There is a revolution going on in criminal activity.  It creates
major problems for law enforcement in almost every part of the
world—problems that have rarely been as systemic and pervasive.
The revolution lies in the ways that networked computers and
other technologies permit crimes to be committed remotely, via the
Internet and wireless communications.  A criminal no longer needs to
be at the actual scene of the crime (or within 1,000 miles, for that
matter) to prey on his victim.  The possibility of an international ele-
ment has been added to almost any crime, which means that cumber-
* Senior Attorney, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Department
of Justice.  From 1993-96, the author was Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General
for the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.  The views expressed in this article
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States.   The
author wishes to thank the following individuals for providing materials and editing manuscript
drafts:  Drew Arena, Scott Charney, Claudia Flynn, James Freund, Sam Hollander, Adam
Isles, and Sara Maurizi.
1. U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, Keynote Address to the Meeting of the G-8 Senior
Experts’ Group on Transnational Organized Crime, Chantilly, VA (Jan. 21, 1997) (transcript
available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/agfranc.htm>) [hereinafter Reno,
Chantilly Keynote Address].  The G-8 is an international multilateral group consisting of Can-
ada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
During the 1990s, there were different names for this group, such as “G-7 plus Russia,” “P-8,”
“The Eight,” and “G-8,” but all of the different monikers refer to the same group of countries.
Use throughout this Article of different G-8 names is for accurate referral to source materials
and is not intended to confer any other meaning.  The genesis, mandate, and current work of
the G-8 are discussed at length, infra, at Section IV(C).
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some mechanisms for international cooperation can slow or derail
many more investigations than ever before.2  Because everything
from banks to phone systems to air traffic control to our military re-
lies so heavily on networked computers, few individuals and institu-
tions are impervious to this new and threatening criminal activity.3
Take the case of a criminal sitting in Russia who routes a com-
munication through Sweden and Italy before hacking into a bank in
New York.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may not be
able to solve the crime without the immediate help of Russian,
Swedish, and Italian authorities.  And the immediacy is critical be-
cause a criminal’s trail often ends as soon as he disconnects from the
Internet.  To make matters worse, technical solutions, laws and legal
processes, and cooperation among governments and with industry are
far behind where they need to be for law enforcement to stay a step
ahead of the bad guys.  Finally, not enough people realize this threat
exists on the scale it does.  Commenting recently about the public’s
awareness of the threat to our nation’s computers from invisible at-
tacks, Richard Clarke, the current White House “terrorism czar”
said:
[CEOs of big corporations] think I’m talking about a 14-year-old
hacking into their Web sites.  I’m talking about people shutting
down a city’s electricity, shutting down 911 systems, shutting down
telephone networks and transportation systems.  You black out a
city, people die.  Black out lots of cities, lots of people die.  It’s as
bad as being attacked by bombs . . . .  Imagine a few years from
now: A President goes forth and orders troops to move.  The lights
2. See, e.g., Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 948
(1996) (stressing the need for an organized international response to the worldwide problem of
computer crime).
3. See Hearings on Infrastructure Protection Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Ter-
rorism and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998), avail-
able in 1998 WL 12761104 (statement of Michael A. Vatis, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation and Chief, National Infrastructure Protection Center) [hereinafter Va-
tis Testimony].  “This Nation depends on the stable, consistent operation of our critical infra-
structures for our way of life, our well-being and our security.  These include: telecommunica-
tions, energy, banking and finance, water systems, and emergency services, both government
and private . . . . And the infrastructures are more interdependent than in the past, with the re-
sult that debilitation or destruction of one could have cascading, destructive effects on others.”
Id.  See generally PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURES 3-20 (1997).  The
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was created by President Clinton
under Executive Order 13010 to study the problem of infrastructure protection in depth and
develop proposed solutions.  See id. at vii.
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go out, the phones don’t ring, the trains don’t move.  That’s what
we mean by an electronic Pearl Harbor.4
At the dawn of the new millennium, at least some modern-day
Paul Reveres are raising the alarm.  A growing number of law en-
forcement officials in the United States and abroad are increasing
awareness and calling for enhancement of high-tech crime-fighting
abilities.5  Likewise, the international community is beginning to take
important action to address this threat to public safety.6  But in many
ways we are just scratching the surface; the long road ahead is going
to require leadership, innovation, and persistence.
This Article will, first, examine the specific challenges posed by
criminals who use computers and networked communications to ply
their craft; second, discuss what needs to be done to effectively com-
bat high-tech crime; and third, examine what steps are currently be-
ing taken in this area by some of the major multilateral organizations,
such as the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the G-8.  I
will offer my assessment of the work being performed by interna-
tional groups, and will draw specific attention to areas where efforts
are inefficient or non-existent.
II.  THE CHALLENGES
Imagine this scene out of tomorrow’s headlines: A hacker, going
on-line through the Internet, breaks into computers that the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) uses for air traffic control.  He dis-
4. Tim Weiner, The Man Who Protects America From Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1999, at A3.  Mr. Clarke has a sign in his office that reads “Think Globally/Act Globally.”  See
id.
5. See, e.g., Paul Boateng, Minister of State for the Home Office (U.K.), Tomorrow’s
Challenges for Law Enforcement, Keynote Address to the Second International Conference
for Criminal Intelligence Analysts (Mar. 1, 1999) (transcript on file with the Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law) (announcing the formation of a Ministerial Committee on
computer misuse).
[C]ommercial organisations may find it ever more problematic securely to maintain
their business transactions, and . . . criminals and criminal enterprises may find an in-
creasing number of opportunities to manipulate systems to their advantage . . . By vir-
tue of the interconnectivity of computer systems in both the private and the public
sectors, there is also the growing danger that a criminal attack on one part of a system
could lead to the failure of the rest.  Moreover, the perpetrator can now just as easily
be a 15 year old ‘surfer’ in Wigan—tomorrow’s cyberwarrior—as a professional gang
of 50 year old fraudsters in Wisconsin.  We must prevent such people from making
these attacks.
Id. at 7.  (The Minister of State for the Home Office in the United Kingdom is equivalent in
rank to the Deputy Attorney General of the United States.)
6. See infra Section IV (discussing work in this area being done by international multilat-
eral organizations).
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rupts a regional air traffic network, and the disruption causes the
crash of a DC-10 in the Rocky Mountains, killing all aboard.  The
FAA and the FBI know there has been a hacker intrusion, originat-
ing through the Internet, but nothing else.  Since anyone can access
the Internet from anywhere in the world, the FBI has no idea where
the hacker may be located.  Moreover, they do not know the motive
of the attack or the identity of the attackers.  Is it a terrorist group,
targeting the United States and likely to strike again at any time, or is
it a fourteen-year-old hacker whose prank has spun tragically out of
control?
Let us follow this scenario a bit further.  Within thirty minutes of
the plane crash, the FBI tracks the source of the attack to an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) in Germany.  Assuming the worst, another at-
tack could occur at any time, and hundreds of planes in flight over
the United States are at risk.  The next investigative step is to deter-
mine whether the ISP in Germany is a mere conduit, or whether the
attack actually originated with a subscriber to that service.  In either
case, the FBI needs the assistance of the German ISP to help identify
the source of the attack, but it is now 3:00 a.m. in Germany.
 Does the FBI dare wait until morning in Europe to seek
formal legal assistance from Germany or permission from
the German government to continue its investigation within
their borders?
 Does the Department of Justice authorize the FBI’s com-
puter experts to conduct a search, without German consent,
on the German ISP from their terminals in Washington?
 Does the FBI agent need a U.S. court order to access private
information overseas?  What would be the reach of such an
order?
 If the FBI agent plows forward and accesses information
from computers in Germany, will the German government
be sympathetic to the U.S. plight, will the violation of Ger-
man sovereignty be condemned, or both?
 What are the diplomatic and foreign policy implications of
the United States remotely (and without advance notice)
conducting a search that may intrude into German sover-
eignty?
The legal and policy implications of possible “transborder
searches,” such as the one contemplated in this scenario, are quickly
becoming a concern for law enforcement agencies around the globe
as they grapple with new challenges posed by networked communica-
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tions and new technologies.7  Traditional investigative procedures—
and particularly the often cumbersome procedures that govern inves-
tigations at the international level—may not be adequate to meet the
need in computer crime cases for immediate law enforcement action
reaching beyond national borders.8  The globalization of criminal ac-
tivity has created vexing problems that, in some cases, defy simple
solutions.9
Before we explore some of the challenges that new high-tech and
computer-related crimes pose, it is important to describe the three
ways that criminals use computers.10  First, a criminal may target or
attack a computer or a system controlled by a computer (e.g., hackers
disrupting local phone service).  Second, a criminal may use a com-
puter to commit a “traditional” crime such as fraud or theft (e.g.,
promoting bogus investments on a Web page).  Third, a criminal may
use a computer in a way that is incidental to the offense, but where
the computer nonetheless contains evidence of a crime (e.g., drug
dealers using personal computers to store records of drug sales and
“clients”).11
The first two kinds of criminal activity can be carried out re-
motely, and often from great distances.  Likewise, evidence of a
crime can be stored at a remote location, either for the purpose of
concealing the crime from law enforcement and others, or simply be-
cause of the design of the network.  “Hackers are not hampered by
the existence of international boundaries, since information and
property can be transmitted covertly via telephone and data net-
works.  A hacker needs no passport and passes no checkpoints.  He
simply types a command to gain entry.”12  This element of remoteness
takes the investigation and prosecution of these crimes out of the ex-
clusive purview of any single nation, thereby creating challenges and
obstacles to crime-solving.13
7. The topic of transborder search and seizure, under which these issues fall, is discussed
infra Section III(D)(2).
8. See Charney & Alexander, supra note 2, at 948.
9. See, e.g., infra Section III(D) (discussing difficulties in locating and identifying crimi-
nals who commit crimes remotely, via networked communications).
10. See Charney & Alexander, supra note 2, at 934.
11. See id.
12. Reno, Chantilly Keynote Address, supra note 1.  See generally Carolyn P. Meinel,
How Hackers Break in . . . And How They Are Caught, SCI. AM., Oct. 1998, at 98-107 (offering
a fictionalized composite of many actual intrusions, or “hacks,” and the attendant counter-
measures that took place in cyberspace, all from remote locations).
13. Examples of criminals hop-scotching the globe by merely using a home computer and
a phone line abound.  Between June and October 1994, a hacker sitting in St. Petersburg, Rus-
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Not long ago, most crimes were local.  The criminal or criminals,
the actual crime, and the victim were all within the same state, if not
the same city.  Such television crime-stoppers as Tony Baretta, Ser-
geant Joe Friday, and Steve McGarrett of Five-O seldom had to go
far to find their man (or woman).14  Physical evidence of the crime
could be found at or near the crime scene, and these cops rarely
needed help from outside their precincts.  It was the extraordinary set
of facts—bank robbers fleeing across state lines, for example—that
brought The F.B.I.’s Inspector Lewis Erskine (played by Efrem Zim-
balist, Jr.) into the case.  From 1965 to 1974, Inspector Erskine,
roaming the United States, investigated counterfeiters, extortionists,
organized crime figures, and bombings by political radicals.  But, with
the exception of the occasional Communist spy, the entirety of each
case rested within the borders of the United States.15
Today, however, characters who seem to come more from Tom
Clancy’s world are taking advantage of powerful personal computers
linked to the Internet and World Wide Web, the explosion of elec-
tronic commerce and e-mail, and wireless and satellite communica-
tions to bring a global dimension to an increasing amount of criminal
activity.16  Targeting computers with malicious programming codes17
from thousands of miles away is no longer the fanciful idea of science
sia, pilfered $5 million from Citibank accounts worldwide and placed the money into his ac-
complice’s accounts in the United States, Israel, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Swit-
zerland.  See Saul Hansell, Citibank Fraud Case Raises Computer Security Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1995, at 31; THE WHITE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY
(May 1998).  The culprit, Vladimir Levin, was extradited to the United States in 1997, pled
guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and was sentenced to thirty-six months’ imprison-
ment.  Approximately $4.5 million of the stolen money was recovered.  Id.
14. Baretta, Friday, and McGarrett are fictional characters, respectively, from the televi-
sion police dramas Baretta (1975-78), Dragnet (1952-70), and Hawaii Five-O (1968-80).  See
TIM BROOKS & EARLE MARSH, THE COMPLETE DIRECTORY TO PRIME TIME NETWORK AND
CABLE TV SHOWS 77, 289, 442-43 (1995).
15. Inspector Erskine was the lead character in the police drama The F.B.I. (1965-74).  See
id. at 326.  The program won the commendation of real-life FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who
gave the show full government cooperation and even allowed filming of some background
scenes at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.  See id.
16. If it is true that art imitates life, then the action-thrillers written by Tom Clancy bear
out these trends.  Tom Clancy, the author of such Cold War bestsellers as THE HUNT FOR RED
OCTOBER (1984), RED STORM RISING (1986), and THE CARDINAL IN THE KREMLIN (1988) is
now churning out such titles as RUTHLESS.COM (1998) (co-authored with Martin Greenberg),
and NET FORCE (1999) (co-authored with Steve Pieczenik).
17. “Malicious programming code” is code that is designed to cause unauthorized damage
to computer systems.
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fiction writers.18  Today, such crimes are becoming the daily workload
for some investigators and prosecutors.19  A computer server running
a Web page designed to defraud senior citizens might be located in
the Seychelle Islands, and victims of the scam could be scattered
throughout twenty-five different countries.  Or an extortionist may
commit blackmail by sending e-mails that run through the communi-
cations networks of five countries before reaching the intended re-
cipient.
As we approach the 21st Century, the irrelevance of borders is
making some old crime-solving paradigms and practices obsolete.
The power of networks and Pentium-driven PCs makes every com-
puter a potential tool for criminals and gives them the ability to reach
across borders with great stealth—and then hang up the phone to
disappear without a trace.20  The globalization of criminal activity and
the anonymity with which criminals can cross electronic “borders” is
a real problem, with a potential to affect every country, every law en-
forcement officer, every citizen.  So what are we to do?
III.  WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
On December 9-10, 1997, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno
held the first-ever meeting of her counterparts from the G-8 coun-
tries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United
Kingdom), with the focus on high-tech and computer-related crime.21
That the first meeting ever held among the senior law-enforcement
officials of the eight countries was centered on computer crime un-
18. See, e.g., WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984) (describing futuristic hackers who
remotely penetrate corporate security systems using intelligent viruses).  Four years after Neu-
romancer was published, in 1988, a Cornell University student named Robert Morris developed
a program known as a “worm,” which he designed to attack computers through the Internet.  A
worm is a self-contained computer program (unlike a “virus,” which must attach itself to other
programs) that duplicates itself and then attempts to penetrate computer systems and cause
damage.  After Morris’s worm penetrated the target computer, it would consume the com-
puter’s available memory, resulting in the shutdown of the computer.  Before his worm could
be neutralized, it had crippled approximately 6,200 computers and caused over $98 million in
damage.  See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
19. For example, the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section at the U.S. De-
partment of Justice in Washington has a staff that includes eighteen attorneys.  Likewise, the
FBI has Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion Squads in seven U.S. cities, with five
more funded and scheduled to be operational by January 1, 2000.
20. See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 465, 467 (1997).
21. See Janet Reno, On the Meeting of Justice and Interior Ministers of The Eight (Dec.
10, 1997) (visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cyber crime/commp8pr.htm>.
The G-8 and its work on high-tech crime is discussed infra at Section IV(C).
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derscores the growing concerns that world leaders share about secu-
rity in cyberspace.22  In a statement to her colleagues, Attorney Gen-
eral Reno highlighted four areas where progress by the international
community is critical if law enforcement is to keep pace with both
technology and the criminals who exploit it:
 First, enactment of sufficient laws to appropriately criminal-
ize computer and telecommunications abuses;
 Second, commitment of personnel and resources to combat-
ing high-tech and computer-related crime;
 Third, improvement in global abilities to locate and identify
those who abuse information technologies; and
 Fourth, development of an improved regime for collecting
and sharing evidence of these crimes, so that those responsi-
ble can be brought to justice.23
The joint Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting
by all eight countries24 as well as the ten Principles and ten-point Ac-
tion Plan agreed to by the Ministers and Attorney General25 reflected
concern for these issues.  Each of these four areas is critical to pro-
22. See Clifford Krauss, 8 Countries Join in an Effort To Catch Computer Criminals, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at A12 (quoting Jack Straw, the British Home Secretary, as saying,
“We’re using 19th-Century tools to face a 21st-century problem.  One person can stay in the
same place and commit crimes in several countries without leaving his armchair.”).
23. Telephone Interview with Scott Charney, Chief, Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section, U.S. Department of Justice and Chair, G-8 Subgroup on High-tech Crime
(Dec. 1, 1998).
24. See Meeting of the Justice and Interior Ministers of The Eight, Communique´ (Dec.
10, 1997) (visited Apr. 19, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/communique.
htm>.
National laws apply to the Internet and other global networks.  But while the enact-
ment and enforcement of criminal laws have been, and remain, a national responsibil-
ity, the nature of modern communications networks makes it impossible for any coun-
try acting alone to address this emerging high-tech crime problem.  A common
approach addressing the unique, borderless nature of global networks is needed and
must have several distinct components.
Each country must have in place domestic laws that ensure that the improper use of
computer networks is appropriately criminalized and that evidence of high-tech
crimes can be preserved and collected in a timely fashion.  Countries must also ensure
that a sufficient number of technically-literate, appropriately-equipped personnel are
available to address high-tech crimes.
Such domestic efforts must be complemented by a new level of international coopera-
tion, especially since global networks facilitate the commission of transborder of-
fenses.  Therefore, consistent with principles of sovereignty and the protection of hu-
man rights, democratic freedoms and privacy, nations must be able to collect and
exchange information internationally, especially within the short time frame so often
required when investigating international high-tech crimes.
Id.
25. See id.  The full text of the Principles and Action Plan are provided infra note 135.
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tecting public safety and ensuring that users of new technologies are
not victimized in new ways.  Each area also poses unique challenges
to ingenuity, national leadership, and international cooperation.  I
will take up each of them separately in the following subsections.
A. Needed: Sufficient Laws to Punish Computer Crimes
When Country A criminalizes certain conduct and Country B
does not, a bridge for cooperation in solving a crime committed in
Country A may not be possible.  The United States has entered into
bilateral treaties of extradition with over 100 countries.26  These trea-
ties are either “list treaties,” containing a list of offenses for which ex-
tradition is available, or they require dual criminality (i.e., require
that the conduct under investigation is a crime in both the requesting
and requested countries and is punishable by at least one year in
prison).27 With regard to treaties for international legal assistance
such as those involving the issuance of subpoenas, interviewing of
witnesses, or production of documents, some treaties permit assis-
tance as long as the conduct under investigation is a crime in the re-
questing state.  The United States strongly favors this approach.28
Other treaties permit assistance only if dual criminality exits and if
the offense is extraditable.29 Therefore, if one country does not crimi-
nalize computer misuse (or provide for sufficient punishment), extra-
dition and the collection of certain evidence may be prohibited.  Con-
sider the following two examples.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1998) (listing treaties of extradition).
27. Telephone Interview with Drew C. Arena, Counselor for Criminal Justice Matters,
U.S. Mission to the European Union (Mar. 9, 1999).  (From 1987 to 1992, Mr. Arena was the
Director of the Office of International Affairs at the U.S. Department of Justice in Washing-
ton, D.C.).
28. See id.  However, in the more sensitive area of search and seizure, some U.S. treaties
either require dual criminality (e.g., Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, June 12, 1981, Neth-
U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 10734 art. 6, para. 1) or allow a party to refuse a request “if it relates to con-
duct in respect of which powers of search and seizure would not be exercisable in the territory
of the Requested Party in similar circumstances.”  Treaty Between the United States of Amer-
ica and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, Dec. 2, 1996, U.S.-Great Britain, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-2 (1996)
[hereinafter US/UK MLAT], art. 14, para. 2.
29. See Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 1959,
Article 5(1)(a) and (b) (allowing parties to those conventions to limit “coercive measures,” e.g.,
search warrants, to situations of either dual criminality or extractability of the underlying of-
fense); Telephone Interview with Drew C. Arena, Counselor for Criminal Justice Matters, U.S.
Mission to the European Union (Mar. 18, 1999).
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In 1992, hackers from Switzerland attacked the San Diego Su-
percomputer Center.30  The United States sought help from the Swiss,
but the investigation was stymied due to lack of dual criminality, (i.e.,
the two nations did not have similar laws banning the conduct), which
became an impediment to official cooperation.  Eventually, local po-
lice in Zurich did render informal assistance, and they prepared a list
of questions for U.S. authorities to answer, transmitted through offi-
cial channels, so the case could be properly pursued.  After the
United States answered those questions, but before follow-up ques-
tions could be answered through official channels, the hacking
stopped, the trail went cold, and the case had to be closed.31
Several years later a similar problem arose, when the United
States found itself unable to reach a criminal in order to bring him to
justice.  From August 1995 until February 1996, the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service and the FBI investigated a hacker who was
stealing password files and altering log files in military, university,
and other private computer systems.32  Many of these systems con-
tained sensitive research on satellites, radiation, and energy-related
engineering.33  U.S. authorities tracked the hacker to Argentina and
notified a local Argentine telecommunications carrier.34  The carrier
contacted local law enforcement, which began its own investigation.
Subsequently, an Argentine judge authorized the search of the
hacker’s apartment and the seizure of his computer equipment based
on potential violations of Argentine law.35  Unfortunately, the treaty
between Argentina and the United States did not authorize the ex-
tradition of individuals for “computer crimes” (although it does for
more traditional crimes).  The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston
charged the perpetrator with several criminal violations, but it was
unclear whether or not the case would ever be resolved due to the
30. Telephone Interview with Scott Charney, Chief, Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section, U.S. Department of Justice and Chair, G-8 Subgroup on High-tech Crime
(Mar. 2, 1999).
31. See id.
32. See Pierre Thomas & Elizabeth Corcoran, Argentine, 22, Charged With Hacking Com-
puter Networks, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1996, at A4; Telephone Interview with Stephen P.
Heymann, Deputy Chief, Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney’s Office (D. Mass.) (Apr. 12, 1999)
(Mr. Heymann is the Computer and Telecommunications Coordinator (CTC) for the District
of Massachussets and was the lead prosecutor for this case).
33. See First Internet Wiretap Leads to a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at A20.
34. See Thomas & Corcoran, supra note 32.
35. See id.
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absence of uniformity between U.S. and Argentine laws.36  Fortu-
nately, the hacker agreed to a plea bargain wherein he waived extra-
dition and agreed to plead guilty in the United States.37
These cases demonstrate how inadequate laws can allow crimi-
nals to go unpunished in one country, while they thwart the efforts of
other countries to vindicate the rights of the state and protect its citi-
zens.  While the United States has amended its criminal code to spe-
cifically penalize a wide variety of computer crimes,38  other countries
have been slower to do so.39  At a meeting of senior law enforcement
officials from the G-8 countries in January 1997, Attorney General
Reno stated:
36. See id.; First Internet Wiretap Leads to a Suspect, supra note 33; Telephone Interview
with Stephen P. Heymann, supra note 32.
37. See First Internet Wiretap Leads to a Suspect,  supra note 33; Telephone Interview with
Stephen P. Heymann, supra note 32.
38. See The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 101-73, codified as U.S.C. §
1030 (1984), amended by the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-294 (1996).  The law contains eleven separate provisions designed to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and systems.  For example, section 1030(a)(2)
makes it a crime to access a computer without or in excess of authority and obtain (1) financial
information from a financial institution or credit reporting company; (2) any information in the
possession of the government; or (3) any private information where the defendant’s conduct
involves interstate or foreign commerce.  Section 1030(a)(5) makes it a crime for anyone to
knowingly cause the transmission of a computer program, information, code, or command, that
results in unauthorized damage to a protected computer.  (A “protected computer” is one used
exclusively by the United States or a financial institution; one used partly by the United States
or a financial institution, in which the defendant’s conduct affects the government’s or financial
institution’s operation of the computer; or any computer that is used in interstate or foreign
commerce or communications.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)).  See also The National Information
Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996, A Legislative Analysis, by the Computer Crime and In-
tellectual Property Section of the U.S. Dept. of Justice  (visited Apr. 1, 1999)
<http:www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/1030_anal.html>; Charney & Alexander, supra note
2, at 949-54 (providing a summary and explanation of the individual provisions of the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act).  The United States also is moving to update statutes concerning
“traditional” crimes, where new technologies present new opportunities for criminals.  See, e.g.,
Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-28. 18 U.S.C. §
2252A (1996) (criminalizing, among other things, the use of computers to create and/or trans-
mit child pornography); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999).  “Congress enacted
the CPPA to modernize federal law by enhancing its ability to combat child pornography in the
cyberspace era . . . . Lawmakers wished to improve law enforcement tools to keep pace with
technological improvements that have made it possible for child pornographers to use comput-
ers to ‘morph’ or alter innocent images of actual children to create a composite image showing
them in sexually explicit poses.”  Hilton, 167 F.3d at 65.
39. For example, while unauthorized access to a computer, without further action, is a
criminal offense in such countries as France, Canada and the United States, it currently is not a
criminal offense in Russia or Japan.  See Charney, supra note 23 (as chair of the G-8 Subgroup
on High-tech Crime, Mr. Charney is compiling the results of a survey completed by G-8 law
enforcement officials on those countries’ legal systems with respect to computer crime).
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[U]ntil recently, computer crime has not received the emphasis that
other international crimes have engendered.  Even now, not all af-
fected nations recognize the threat it poses to public safety or the
need for international cooperation to effectively respond to the
problem.  Consequently, many countries have weak laws, or no
laws, against computer hacking—a major obstacle to solving and to
prosecuting computer crimes.40
The solution to this problem is simple to state:  “[countries] need
to reach a consensus as to which computer and technology-related ac-
tivities should be criminalized, and then commit to taking appropri-
ate domestic actions.”41  But it is not as easy to implement.  An inter-
national “consensus” concerning the activities that universally should
be criminalized may take time to develop.  Meanwhile, individual
countries that lack this kind of legislation will each have to pass new
laws, an often cumbersome and time-consuming process.  In the
United States, for example, action by both the Congress and the
President is required for new legislation.
B. Needed: Personnel and Resources to Combat High-tech Crime
In 1986, an astronomer-turned-systems-manager at the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley found a seventy-five cent accounting er-
ror in the computer’s billing program, which led to the discovery that
an unauthorized user had penetrated Berkeley’s computer system.42
When the astronomer, Clifford Stoll, began to investigate further, he
discovered a hacker identified as “Hunter” was using Berkeley’s
computer system as a conduit to break into U.S. government systems
and steal sensitive military information.43  The hacker’s objective
seemed to be to spy on the United States’ “Star Wars” missile de-
fense program.
Stoll encountered serious problems as he began to pursue the
hacker.  To begin with, Stoll was unable to find computer literate law
enforcement personnel with an appreciation of the technical nature
of the criminal activity.  He also found that the legal processes re-
quired to locate and identify the hacker while he or she was online
and thereby traceable were inadequate.44  Various local and federal
40. Reno, Chantilly Keynote Address, supra note 1.
41. Id.
42. See generally CLIFFORD STOLL, THE CUCKOO’S EGG: TRACKING A SPY THROUGH
THE MAZE OF COMPUTER ESPIONAGE (1989) (describing the author’s ten-month odyssey in
search of the hacker).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 43.
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agencies that Stoll contacted, including the FBI and Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA), initially expressed little interest in pursuing
what at first looked like a computer prank.45  When local police fi-
nally issued a California order to trace a phone call, the trail led to
Virginia where the order had no force.  When the call was finally
traced to Germany, the German telecommunications carrier could
not quickly ascertain the source of the attacks because the trace had
to be accomplished through mechanical switches.  As Stoll and those
assisting him moved backwards through the labyrinth of telecommu-
nications to its source, they found a dearth of law enforcement per-
sonnel with technical expertise who could help.46
Stoll’s “investigation” brought to light a number of interdepend-
ent “personnel” and “resource” requirements that, unless fulfilled,
will impede the success of law enforcement in this burgeoning area.
It is critical that the requirements summarized below are met at the
international level to eliminate weak links in the chain of an investi-
gation.
1. Experts Dedicated to High-tech Crime.  The complex
technical and legal issues raised by computer-related crime require
that each country have individuals who are dedicated to high-tech
crime.  These individuals are needed to support domestic law
enforcement authorities faced with high-tech issues, and they will be
the first point of contact for their international counterparts.47
45. Until government investigators learned of the potential threat to national security,
they had no interest in pursuing a case which appeared to have damages valued at less than
$1.00.  See id. (describing how the FBI in Montgomery, Alabama would investigate a computer
crime only after a million dollars was at stake); see also Goodman, supra note 20 (discussing
law enforcement disinterest in pursuing computer crimes).
46. See generally STOLL, supra note 42.  Since Hunter’s trail evaporated each time he
ended a communication, Stoll had to resort to generating phony official-looking data to keep
the hacker interested and online long enough for the trace to be completed.  Eventually, the
source of the attacks was identified, and the hacker was prosecuted in Germany.  Ironically,
one of the reasons the investigation was successful is because Stoll worked directly with tele-
phone company personnel, who in turn worked with other telecommunications providers, in-
stead of working with the government.  See id. at 53, 225.
47. See Reno, Chantilly Keynote Address, supra note 1 (“[We must ensure] that law en-
forcement personnel are capable of addressing high-tech crime by understanding two emerging
and converging technologies simultaneously: computers and telecommunications.  The com-
plexity of these technologies, and their constant and rapid change, suggest that countries need
to designate investigators and prosecutors to . . . work these cases on a full-time basis, immers-
ing themselves in computer-related investigations and prosecutions.”); Reno, supra note 21
(“Countries must also ensure that a sufficient number of technically-literate, appropriately-
equipped personnel are available to address high-tech crimes.”).
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2. Experts Available on a Twenty-Four Hour Basis.  A unique
feature of high-tech and computer-related crime is that it requires
immediate action to locate and identify perpetrators. Due to a
general lack of historical communications data, the trail of a criminal
may be impossible to trace once a communication link is terminated.
This lack of data is due, in part, to the fact that businesses no longer
bill their customers by individual telephone call or Internet
connection but, instead, by bulk billing (e.g., a single rate for one
month of usage).48  When bulk billing is employed, there is no longer
a business need to record the transmission information (i.e.,
connection times or source and destination) for individual
connections; therefore, traffic data may not be available at a later
date.  Thus, investigators and prosecutors with expertise in this field
must be available twenty-four hours a day, at home and by pager, so
that appropriate steps can be taken in a fast-breaking high-tech case.
3. Continuous Training.  Because of the phenomenal rate at
which computer technologies evolve, and because high-tech criminal
techniques and capabilities change more rapidly than those in more
traditional areas of criminal activity, experts must receive continuous
training in the investigation and prosecution of high-tech cases.  In
addition to domestic training, countries should participate in
coordinated training with other countries, so transnational cases can
be pursued quickly and seamlessly.49
4. Up-to-date Equipment.  To keep pace with computer
criminals, law enforcement experts in this field must be properly
equipped with the latest hardware and software.  There was a time
when police needed little more than a gun, handcuffs, flashlight, and
a notepad.  Today, providing them with proper equipment may prove
to be one of the more difficult challenges, because the cost of
purchasing sophisticated equipment and software to keep pace with
48. See, e.g., James Peltz & Michael Hiltzik, Takeover Possible at Earthlink, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1999, at C7.
49. In the United States, high-tech prosecutors at the federal level attend a one-week
training course every year, with training provided by both government and private sector per-
sonnel.  Likewise, all federal investigative agencies provide high-tech training to their agents.
The government’s National Cybercrime Training Partnership is developing high-tech training
for federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel.  See generally Martin Kettle & Owen
Bowcott, Computer Crime: The Age of the Digital Sleuth, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 12, 1997, at 19.
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rapid advances in technology places considerable burdens on the
budget process.50
To get approval to hire and/or allocate dedicated personnel, to
commit time and money to training, and to find millions of dollars for
frequent purchases and upgrades of equipment and software, senior
policy-makers—often acting under tight budget constraints—must
become directly involved and provide strong leadership.  In fact, to
ensure that high-tech issues receive appropriate attention, the sup-
port of officials at the level of Attorney General, or Justice or Inte-
rior Minister may be required.51
C. Needed: Improved Abilities to Locate and Identify Criminals
When a hacker disrupts the telephone network of a Baby Bell,
when the White House receives an e-mail threatening the President,
or when the files of a Fortune 500 company are stolen via the Inter-
net, a primary investigative requirement is to locate the source of the
attack.  To do so requires tracing the “electronic trail” from the vic-
tim back to the attacker.  As we enter the new millennium, law en-
forcement personnel chasing a hacker’s trail face a landscape dra-
matically different from the recent pre-Internet era.
In today’s communications environment, as a result of corporate
divestiture, a single carrier usually does not carry a communication
from end-to-end.  The days when the police worked alone with “Ma
Bell” to solve a crime are over.  A hacker’s transmission may pass
from his or her computer to a local phone company, to an ISP, to a
long-distance telephone carrier, to a university computer, across an
ocean via satellite, on its way to a foreign corporate victim.52  Con-
sider that:
50. Cf. Goodman, supra note 20; Jon Bigness, Dick Tracy Comes to Life, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
15, 1997, at 1C.
51. Unfortunately, many of the senior policy-makers and budget gurus in government are
unfamiliar with new computer and telecommunications technologies, and with the threats
posed by computer criminals.  If these individuals are not familiar with the technologies at issue
and the new threats they pose, they may be hesitant to support law enforcement by seeking
appropriate legislative and budgetary changes.  See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 4 (“In his of-
fice, . . . [White House terrorism czar Richard Clarke] spoke passionately about the threat of
cyberwar, invisible attacks on the nation’s computers, a terror so insidious, so arcane he has
trouble convincing corporate chieftains and political commissars that it is real.”).
52. See, e.g., Computer Hacker Sought; European Man Cracked Thousands of Passwords
Worldwide, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 29, 1998, at 5A (reporting a hacker detected in the
network of the University of California at Berkeley math department after gaining Internet
access by way of modem through a Swedish Internet Service Provider and passing his commu-
nications through such countries as the United Kingdom, Denmark and South Korea).
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 a nefarious communication may pass through a large number
of carriers (e.g., Sprint PCS to Bell Atlantic to CompuServe
to AT&T to MCI to the Microsoft Network to Deutsche
Telekom);
 the communication may pass through many different types of
carriers, each with different technologies (e.g., local tele-
phone companies, long-distance carriers, ISPs, wireless and
satellite networks);53 and
 the communication may pass through carriers in a number of
different countries, each in different time zones and subject to
different legal systems.
And, unfortunately, each of these differentiations may occur
within one individual hacker attack.
Because tracing the trail from victim back to attacker may be
possible only when the hacker is actually on line (since transmission
information is often not recorded and retained), law enforcement of-
ficials must work at lightning-fast speed.  However, the traditional in-
ternational legal assistance regime often cannot accommodate re-
quests for assistance that occur during a cyber-attack because
responses cannot be handled in real-time.54  Inefficient and overly bu-
reaucratic instruments for mutual legal assistance need to give way to
more practical approaches.
A further set of complications arises with each individual carrier
approached by law enforcement.  First, in order to be able to assist
law enforcement officials, the technical infrastructure (i.e., the com-
munications network and the computers and software that run it)
needs to have been designed and configured to generate and preserve
53. Locating and identifying a criminal who is using an array of carriers becomes much
more challenging when wireless communications are used.  Previously, when a telephone was
used in a crime, a telephone line physically connected the perpetrator to a specific location.  If
the call could be traced, police knew exactly where the call originated.  At the same time, law
enforcement could find out the name of the person who was being billed for the phone line,
although that person may not, of course, have been actually using the phone at the time of the
offense.
But today, mobile phones allow an individual to commit crimes while roaming around
the globe.  In certain cases, sophisticated technologies can permit law enforcement to identify
the general area where a wireless call is coming from, but such information may not be specific
enough to allow an arrest to be made.  Even then, however, identifying the owner of a particu-
lar mobile phone can be difficult, because mobile phones can be altered to transmit phony
identifying information.  Moreover, as mobile phones become less expensive, criminals can use
them as “disposable phones,” so that evidence linking the perpetrator to the communication is
destroyed immediately after the commission of the crime.
54. See generally STOLL, supra note 42.
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critical traffic data, such as the information relating to the source and
destination of a cyber-attack.55  In certain instances, technologies to
generate and preserve this data simply do not exist.  Second, assum-
ing the particular piece of the technical infrastructure is capable of
generating and preserving needed data, carriers must in fact actually
collect and retain such records.56  Examples of current industry prac-
tices that leave carriers without critical data include offering free
anonymous e-mail accounts where subscriber information is not re-
quested or verified; implementing dynamic addressing systems at
ISPs (i.e., Internet addresses for computers are re-assigned with each
new connection); and deciding against generating or maintaining rec-
ords for local telephone calls.  Third, law enforcement must be al-
lowed timely access to this information by the carrier.  Accordingly,
listed below are the steps that need to be taken so that law enforce-
ment can navigate through the contours of this dynamic environment
to find computer criminals.
1. Technical Standards Must Promote Public Safety.  Countries
need to reach a consensus as to the technical requirements and
industry standards in hardware, software, Internet protocols, and
related technologies that are most critical to law enforcement needs.
Thereafter, countries must develop a process for encouraging
technical specifications that promote public safety.
2. Critical Traffic Data Must be Preserved.  Countries should
ensure that telecommunications carriers and ISPs routinely store
55. The use by many ISPs of “modem banks” or “hunt groups,” to address increasing de-
mand for Internet access is an example of a network design that can obfuscate critical traffic
data.  Where a modem bank is used, an ISP may have hundreds (or thousands) of phone lines,
but the ISP gives its customers just one access number (e.g., 555-1234).  The ISP’s network is
configured to automatically route each incoming call to the “next” available line, but without
linking a customer with a specific incoming line, it may be impossible to tell through which
phone line a cyber-attack is transmitted.
56. In some countries, telecommunications carriers and ISPs are required by law to rou-
tinely retain data that later may be critical to a criminal investigation; in other countries, such
retention is prohibited. And in the third case, a country’s laws may be silent on this topic, leav-
ing companies to weigh public safety concerns, privacy interests, and market forces in devel-
oping their practices.  Of particular concern to U.S. law enforcement are the EU’s 1995 and
1997 directives concerning the processing of personal data, which will require deletion of traffic
data.  See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. 31 (L 281); Directive 97/66/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of December 15, 1997 Concerning the Processing of Personal
Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 1997 O.J. 1 (L 24) (Jan.
30, 1998).  See discussion infra Part IV.B. and accompanying footnotes.
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access logs and other key traffic data for certain minimum periods of
time (e.g., ninety days).  Countries also need to adopt legal processes
that allow law enforcement to request that a carrier or ISP retain
specific traffic data for longer periods of time, should that data be
needed for a criminal investigation.57
3. Information Must Be Shared Quickly.  When a communi-
cation travels through several carriers, law enforcement must obtain
court orders in each successive jurisdiction through which a signal
passes in order to trace the communication to its source.58  If there
are points of origin in different jurisdictions, investigators must go to
separate courthouses to obtain necessary court orders.  “This
consumes valuable time and scarce resources and impedes
identification of the perpetrator.”59  Legal processes must be
improved to account for new technologies and find ways to remove
unwieldy, piecemeal mechanics from domestic and international
investigations.60
When information is sought from carriers in different countries,
applications to obtain critical information currently need to be made
separately in each country; the resulting delay can debilitate investi-
gators in hot pursuit.  Unfortunately, innovative solutions for expe-
diting international cooperation have not yet been developed.  We
should consider whether traditional means of legal assistance (i.e.,
requests under mutual legal assistance treaties and use of letters ro-
gatory) need to be supplemented with procedures that will facilitate
the immediate sharing of traffic data, or whether other avenues
should be explored.61
57. See infra note 67.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 2703(f) (requiring a telecommunications carrier
or ISP to retain data for up to 180 days at the request of law enforcement).  As law-making
bodies take up the issue of data protection and other restrictions on the collection and storage
of communications data, law enforcement agencies must work to ensure that new data protec-
tion policies do not create safe havens for computer criminals, but instead balance privacy con-
cerns with public safety needs.
58. See generally STOLL, supra note 42; 18 U.S.C.S. § 3121 (Supp. 1989) (“trap and trace”
statute).
59. Statement of Attorney General Janet Reno before the United States Senate Commit-
tee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, available
in 1999 WL 8084451 (Feb. 4, 1999).
60. In Senate testimony, Attorney General Reno discussed a High-Technology Crime Bill
being considered by the Department of Justice that would address “several technical and pro-
cedural infirmities that inhibit effective investigation and prosecution of cybercrime.”  One
amendment to existing statutes would “allow federal judges to direct cooperation among suc-
cessive communications providers that carry a particular communication.”  Id.
61. See Reno, Chantilly Keynote Address, supra note 1.
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4. Government/Industry Cooperation is Imperative.  There is
broad international consensus that cooperation with industry is
integral, and indeed critical, to investigating high-tech crime and
thereby protecting public safety.62  Governments should recognize
that the needs of law enforcement may place burdens on industry and
thus take reasonable steps to minimize such burdens.63  At the same
time, industry ought to consider the safety of the public when
responding to the needs of the market.  Cooperation can be enhanced
in two ways.  First, by establishing investigative points-of-contact
with critical communications carriers. Second, by standardizing
procedures by which investigators seek assistance from industry.
Above all, governments must foster an operational relationship with
industry based on trust.64
D. Needed: Effective Means for Obtaining Evidence Internationally
Even if all countries have adequate computer crime laws, possess
dedicated, well-trained and well-equipped experts who are available
twenty-four hours a day, and have the ability to locate and identify
criminals who use networked communications, there remains a sig-
nificant hurdle to overcome.  How does law enforcement collect elec-
tronic evidence that may be scattered across several different coun-
tries, can be deleted or altered with one click of a mouse, may be
encrypted, and will ultimately need to be authenticated in another
country’s court?  Again, these are areas where the challenges have
been recognized but solutions either may not be apparent or may be
difficult to implement.
1. Protected Seizures or “Quick Freeze/Quick Thaw.”  One
characteristic of electronic evidence is that it can be altered,
transferred or destroyed almost instantaneously, and from remote
62. See Reno, supra note 21.  At their meeting in December 1997, Attorney General Reno
and the G-8 Justice and Interior Ministers affirmed their commitment to broad cooperation
with industry:
The development of effective solutions will also require unprecedented cooperation
between government and industry.  It is the industrial sector that is designing, de-
ploying and maintaining these global networks and is primarily responsible for the de-
velopment of technical standards.  Thus, it is incumbent on the industrial sector to
play its part in developing and distributing secure systems that, when accompanied by
adherence to good computer and personnel security practices, serve to prevent com-
puter abuse.  Such systems should also be designed to help detect computer abuse,
preserve electronic evidence, and assist in ascertaining the location and identity of
criminals.  Id.
63. See id.
64. See Kettle & Bowcott, supra note 49.
SUSSMANN_3.DOC 09/09/99  9:42 AM
470 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 9:451
locations, often with little more than a single keystroke.65 These
changes to evidence may result from a criminal trying to cover his
tracks, or a system administrator routinely clearing old e-mails or
other data from a company’s servers.  Whatever the case, critical
evidence can be lost—long before an international request for
assistance is ever transmitted.  Traditional methods of obtaining
evidence from foreign governments can include lengthy delays, as
foreign legal processes, translations, and diplomacy slowly proceed.66
Old modalities may not always be practical when considering new
technologies.
Therefore, when electronic evidence is sought, there may be a
need for mechanisms such as a “preservation of evidence request” or
“protected seizure,” which would work as follows. Where there is a
particularized concern about the loss of electronic evidence, a coun-
try would make an informal international request that the data im-
mediately be preserved.  This could be accomplished in a number of
ways, from having a telecommunications carrier or ISP copy and
store a customer’s data, to actually seizing a criminal’s computer and
securing, but not searching, it for a short period of time.67 Once data
is protected from loss, expedited processes would provide the foreign
country with formal documentation to authorize the issuance of a
domestic search warrant or similar process.68
2. Transborder Search and Seizure.69  Since paper documents
must be within close proximity to be of use, they are usually located
65. See, e.g., STOLL, supra note 42; Kettle & Bowcott, supra note 49.
66. In addition, immediately after a system intrusion, law enforcement authorities may be
certain that a crime has occurred and may have identified a potential source, but they may be
days away from providing the particularized information usually required by a foreign govern-
ment before assistance can be granted.  It is in that window, between the detection of the crime
and formal request, that there is a great risk of deletion, alteration or destruction of evidence.
See generally STOLL, supra note 42.
67. The U.S. Code provides for a form of “preservation of evidence request.”  A tele-
communications carrier or ISP is required, “at the request of a governmental entity, [to] take
all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issu-
ance of a court order or other process.”  18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (1994).  The government can
have these records retained for up to 180 days.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(2).  This is an important
example of how legal processes can be modernized to account for advances in communications
and related technologies; implementation of this process on an international level would
greatly enhance existing modalities of international legal assistance.  See infra note 135, Princi-
ple V, Action Item 4-6, 8.
68. See Reno, Chantilly Keynote Address, supra note 1.
69. The following discussion on transborder search and seizure is based on the substantial
work of Scott Charney, Chief, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. De-
partment of Justice.  Telephone Interviews with Scott Charney, Chief, Computer Crime and
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in the same country as the person being investigated.  By contrast,
electronic documents are often stored remotely on computers,
sometimes thousands of miles away from their author.  This may be
done because of the structure of a particular business (where data is
maintained at company headquarters) or the architecture of the
network.70  At other times, data may be purposely stored in another
country to keep it beyond the reach of law enforcement.
A transborder search occurs when a law enforcement agent in
his or her own country accesses a computer in another country to ob-
tain electronic evidence, perhaps in furtherance of the execution of a
domestic warrant.  For example, in the hypothetical discussed in Sec-
tion II (where a hacker had broken into FAA computers), U.S. inves-
tigators would likely have conducted a transborder search due to exi-
gent circumstances (i.e., the possibility of imminent death or serious
injury to air travelers).  Also, a law enforcement agent can unknow-
ingly conduct a transborder search, when he is not aware that his
search has led him across a border.  If an investigator searches the
computer of a domestic corporation, it may be difficult to know
where data accessed through that domestic terminal is actually
stored.  One site may have a link to another site, and the investigator
may not know his communication was routed from a server in Dallas
to one in Toronto.  Because searches made under exigent circum-
stances (including those where it is believed evidence will be de-
stroyed if not seized) and inadvertent searches across borders are
likely to occur, it may be wise for countries to consider developing
rules and/or guidelines to govern a transborder search (e.g., regarding
notice to the searched country).
Governments have three potential solutions at this juncture.
First, governments could decide to forego the development of princi-
ples, allowing each country to decide for itself whether transborder
searches constitute an acceptable law enforcement practice.71  Sec-
Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Department of Justice and Chair, G-8 Subgroup on High-
tech Crime (Dec. 1998 to Feb. 1999).
70. For example, while America Online provides service in the United States, Europe and
Asia, all of its data is stored on its computers in Reston, Virginia.  When two people in Japan
use AOL accounts to e-mail one another, all of their data is stored in the United States.  Thus,
if Japanese law enforcement tries to investigate a local crime involving two people who live
within the same square mile in Tokyo, the Japanese must seek the assistance of U.S. law en-
forcement to get at any e-mail on AOL’s server.  Perhaps inappropriately, the documents are
accessible to the account-holders in Japan, but beyond the reach of Japanese law enforcement.
71. If this approach is taken, the most difficult scenario may arise where the searching
country takes the view that a transborder search is, under some theory, permissible, and the
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ond, governments could limit transborder searches to cases where
production of the data could otherwise be compelled through legal
processes.72  This approach expedites the gathering of certain critical
evidence while allowing data outside the traditional reach of a coun-
try to remain so.  The third solution involves creating principles per-
mitting law enforcement agents to conduct transborder searches un-
der clearly defined circumstances that are more broad than those
above.  Support for this approach may rest on a consensus that the
need for effective law enforcement outweighs concerns over pro-
tecting data stored in a particular country.
Unfortunately, the area of transborder searches is one where
agreement on a particular approach may represent only a tiny step
toward resolving other seemingly intractable issues such as how ju-
risdiction over stored data should be perceived and defined.  One
senior British law enforcement official has offered the following:
Jurisdiction over a database should not now depend only on where
it happens to be physically stored.  Where the owners of the system
have set it up to be accessible from another jurisdiction, it should be
regarded as present in that jurisdiction for law enforcement pur-
poses.
I recognise this raises difficult constitutional issues for all of us.  I
hope it will be clear that this [is] not international Governments
acting together in an Orwellian idea of ‘Big Brother.’  Transborder
search principles would need to be accompanied by agreed mini-
mum standards and safeguards.  But time is limited.73
Because the potential for transborder searches exists in almost
every country, progress cannot be put off simply because of the diffi-
cult legal and policy issues that litter the path to a comprehensive
solution.  Although, as discussed in Section IV, debates on this topic
searched country responds that the execution of that search is not only prohibited in its country
but constitutes unauthorized access to its computers and therefore is a criminal offense.
72. For example, when a foreign corporation is doing business in one of the fifty United
States, it is subject to that state’s (as well as U.S.) laws, and under certain circumstances the
corporation can be compelled to produce documents stored in another country.  See United
States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982) (enforcing grand jury subpoena
duces tecum in tax and narcotics investigation of U.S. citizen, where subpoena called for pro-
duction of records in branch office in the Bahamas and compliance would require bank to vio-
late Bahamian bank secrecy rule).
73. Paul Boateng, supra note 5.  This philosophy is not unlike that used by the court in
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384.  See also discussion supra note 72.
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are currently taking place in multilateral fora, any outcome is far
from certain.74
3. Encryption.  Encryption is a method of scrambling data to
protect its confidentiality.  Mathematical algorithms are used in
conjunction with “keys” (frequently, the key is a password) to hide
content, and the intended recipient of an encrypted e-mail message
or the user of an encrypted file can only read the message or file if he
or she has access to the key.  Encryption is important to protect the
confidentiality of e-mail traffic, stored data, and commercial
transactions.75
When encryption is used by criminals for communications or
data storage, investigations can be severely hampered because en-
cryption can prevent timely access to the content of seized or inter-
cepted data.  Debates concerning the regulation of encryption, as
well as a possible management infrastructure for decryption keys, are
underway within governments, between governments, and between
governments and industry.76  There has been a wealth of material al-
ready written on regulation, key management, and related topics,77
and discussion on those points is beyond the scope of this article.
What is worth noting, however, is that whatever the overall re-
gime and the legislative and regulatory framework, mutual legal as-
sistance arrangements between countries must include some manner
of decryption support services and governments must have the legal
ability to provide such support.78  Consider the case where French law
74. Unfortunately, a thorough discussion of transborder search and seizure issues is be-
yond the scope of this Article; many of these issues are still being framed and debated within
and among governments.
75. See generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, AL-
GORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN C (2d ed. 1996).
76. For information concerning U.S. policy on encryption, see, for example, Department
of Justice Frequently Asked Questions on Encryption Policy; Letter from Attorney General
Reno and others to Members of Congress regarding law enforcement’s concerns related to en-
cryption; Senate Hearings on Privacy in a Digital Age: Encryption and Mandatory Access; and
Testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert S. Litt Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Commerce Committee,
Sept. 4, 1997 (visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/crypto.html>.
77. See, e.g., STEPHEN KENT, ET AL., SPECIAL PANEL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR
COMPUTING MACHINERY U.S. POLICY COMMITTEE, CODES, KEYS AND CONFLICTS: ISSUES IN
U.S. CRYPTO POLICY (1994); KENNETH DAM & HERBERT LIN, CRYPTOGRAPHY’S ROLE IN
SECURING THE INFORMATION DAM, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE TO STUDY
NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY (1996).
78. The United States has dozens of bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties in effect.
The more modern treaties have flexibility to accommodate “newer” forms of assistance, such
as decryption support.  As an example, the U.S./U.K. MLAT art. 1, para. 2(h) provides for
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enforcement requests data from the United States that is needed for
a criminal investigation.  Assume this request is contemplated under
French/U.S. legal assistance practices.  If U.S. authorities retrieve the
data and it is encrypted, and the decryption key is stored in the
United States, the data will be of little use to the French if we supply
it to them as is.  Further, the United States will be in the best position
to have the data decrypted, either by learning the password from the
target of the investigation, or by otherwise obtaining the key.79  While
commitments to provide decryption support do not exist as such to-
day, the need for them will become more dire as the use of powerful
encryption becomes more widespread.
4. Computer Forensics.  Imagine that you are handling a case
involving two business partners, Sam and Harry.  Assume a particular
e-mail message is important to your proof.  Your witness, Sam,
testifies that Harry made false statements when applying for a bank
loan.  On cross-examination, Harry’s lawyer tries to suggest that
Sam’s testimony is a recent fabrication.
To rebut the charge of recent fabrication, you introduce into
evidence an e-mail that Sam sent to another colleague, Bob, at the
time of Harry’s false statements, that is consistent with Sam’s testi-
mony at trial.80  Harry’s lawyer calls Bob as a witness and introduces
Bob’s copy of the e-mail into evidence—but this one is missing the
“such other assistance as may be agreed between Central Authorities.”  However, other trea-
ties lacking such provisions could be construed to prohibit assistance that is not explicitly stated
in their texts.  In those cases, an amending document may be required in order to make decryp-
tion support available.  See U.S./U.K. MLAT, supra note 28.
79. For an interesting examination of the legal issues raised by law enforcement’s attempts
to gain access to plaintext (i.e., unencrypted or decrypted text) and keys, see Phillip Reitinger,
Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, The Law of Cyberspace, U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 171
(1996).  The author determines the principal legal obstacle to law enforcement access to be the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and he concludes that a grand jury sub-
poena can direct the production of the plaintext of encrypted documents, although a limited
form of immunity may be required; and a grand jury subpoena may direct the production of
documents that reveal keys.  Whether law enforcement can compel production of keys that are
only known, rather than recorded, is an open question.  See id. at 173.
80. The document would fall outside the definition of hearsay and therefore be admissible
after a sufficient foundation is laid.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (“A statement is not hear-
say if . . . [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination con-
cerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or im-
proper influence or motive.”).
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paragraph which refers to Harry having lied.81  So there are two cop-
ies of the “same” e-mail; one, however, contains text that is not con-
tained in the other.  What do you do?
Similar problems concerning authenticity of evidence can arise
with digital images.  By now we have all probably seen (but possibly
not known we did) magazine covers with a celebrity’s head seam-
lessly attached to a younger and more fit body.82  Today, if a photo is
being used as evidence, you have to ask: is it real, or was it created
(or altered) by merely rearranging binary digits?  Further, when in-
formation incidental to a document’s content, such as the date it was
created or last “saved,” is important to your proof, how are you going
to assure the judge (and jury) that this information was not inadver-
tently altered when your witness retrieved it from his computer?  Put
another way, how is the integrity of an electronic medium maintained
when it is brought into the courtroom?
The emerging field which addresses these issues is known as
“computer forensics.”83  It encompasses the development and use of
scientific protocols and procedures for searching computers, analyz-
ing data, and maintaining the authenticity of data that has been re-
trieved.84  From a practical standpoint, there are two tasks that ex-
perts in this field perform, although the line between the two often
can blur.  First, they retrieve electronic evidence.  Any lawyer can list
and print the document files on a hard drive (e.g., the Word or
WordPerfect documents on the “C” drive), but it may take an expert
to gather evidence that has been deleted (sometimes with powerful
programs or devices), hidden, encrypted, or protected with pass-
words, software time bombs, or other devices that could destroy the
81. This document, again, is not hearsay, because it is not being offered for the truth of the
statement contained therein, but instead to show that Sam’s copy of the e-mail has been doc-
tored.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
82. See, e.g., Mark Kennedy, When Seeing Isn’t Believing: Digital Altering of Celebrity
Photos is Becoming the Norm, THE STAR LEDGER, Sept. 1, 1997 (discussing such digital altera-
tions as a TV Guide cover in 1989 featuring Oprah Winfrey’s face superimposed on Ann Mar-
garet’s body; Time magazine having darkened O.J. Simpson’s mug shot for its cover; and Pre-
miere magazine having removed Harrison Ford’s facial scar for its cover; and stating, “Now it’s
possible for anyone with a few hours on a mid-priced desktop computer . . . to alter the content
of photos.”)
83. See generally Joan E. Feldman & Roger I. Kohn, The Essentials of Computer Discov-
ery, LW GLASS CLE 297 (1998); Gregory S. Johnson, A Practitioner’s Overview of Digital Dis-
covery, 1997-98 GONZ. L. REV. 347.
84. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FBI LABO-
RATORY ANNUAL REPORT ‘98 6, 15 (1999); Michael G. Noblett, Computer Analysis and Re-
sponse Team (CART):  The Microcomputer as Evidence, 19 CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 10, 10
(Jan. 1992).
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evidence. The other aspect of this field is maintaining the authenticity
of electronic data such that it can be probative in grand jury or court-
room proceedings.
In the United States, generally accepted protocols and proce-
dures have been established so that  (1) investigators searching com-
puters have great success retrieving stored data, and (2) proof of
authenticity and associated challenges are in keeping with those asso-
ciated with physical evidence.85  Outside of the United States, some
countries have the same (or possibly greater) capabilities, but a sig-
nificant number of others find themselves lacking in such profi-
ciency.86  The remedy to this disparity in abilities lies in international
training and sharing of information and forensic tools.  Organized ef-
forts are currently underway to effect these changes.87  With regard to
authenticity, internationally recognized standards in computer foren-
sics need to be adopted and implemented so that evidence gathered
in one country can be introduced in proceedings in another country
as a matter of course.
IV.  WHAT IS BEING DONE BY MULTI-LATERAL
ORGANIZATIONS?
To date, three multilateral organizations (i.e., groups with multi-
ple-nation membership) are doing the bulk of the international policy
work on high-tech and computer-related crime: the Council of
Europe (COE), the European Union (EU) and its related institu-
tions, and the G-8.  To a lesser degree, some work in this area has
been done by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), and the United Nations.88
Of the three main groups, the G-8 has been particularly effective
in making progress on several fronts.  While the EU and COE have
large European memberships, the G-8 has broader representation,
with members from Europe, Russia, North America, and Japan.89
85. See id.; PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERPOL FORENSIC SCIENCE SYMPOSIUM 14-
51 (Richard Frank & Harold Peel eds. 1998).
86. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERPOL FORENSIC SCIENCE SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 85, at 8-43 (containing survey responses concerning specific aspects of computer forensics
for fifteen countries, such as Australia, China, and Spain).
87. See discussion, infra Section IV.
88. See discussion of these multilateral groups infra Section IV.A-E.  Work is being done
in some instances on a bilateral (two-country) basis.  But the broad international policy in this
area is being done in the multilateral fora, and an examination of bilateral efforts underway is
beyond the scope of this article.
89. See infra Section IV.C.
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Because networked communications traverse every continent, and
because leading communications and computer technology is devel-
oped in areas besides Europe (such as Asia and North America), re-
gional efforts to solve universal crime problems will inevitably be ei-
ther slower or less effective than similar efforts by policy-making
bodies with a broad geographic base.
The heads of state of the G-8 countries meet annually.  At their
1998 Summit, they adopted a comprehensive plan to fight high-tech
and computer-related crime.90  While the COE started addressing
computer crime at the technical level in 1988, its heads of state have
only met twice since 1949 when the COE was created, and have never
addressed computer crime.91  While EU heads of state called for a
study of the subject and development of relevant policies, the heads
of state from its member countries have not settled on a specific plan
of action to combat computer crime.92  Finally, unlike the COE and
EU, the G-8 is neither governed by international convention nor con-
strained by a convention-created bureaucracy.  It can therefore move
faster and address new and emerging areas as the will of its leaders
dictates.
A. The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe (COE) is an international organization
based in Strasbourg, France.93  It was established by ten Western
European countries in the wake of the Second World War, with the
signing of its founding treaty, known as the Statute of the Council of
Europe, in 1949.94  Today, it has a pan-European membership of forty
countries, which include the Baltic states, Russia and Turkey.95  It de-
fines its main role as strengthening democracy, human rights, and the
rule of law throughout its member states.96  In the area of criminal
law, twenty conventions and over eighty recommendations have been
adopted, as well as a number of reports on crime issues.97
90. See infra Section IV.C.2 & note 135.
91. See Arena, supra note 29.
92. See infra Section IV.B.
93. See About the Council of Europe (last modified Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/eng/
present/about.htm>.
94. See A Brief History of the Council of Europe (last modified Jan. 28, 1998) <http://www.
coe.fr/eng/present/history.htm>.
95. See About the Council of Europe, supra note 93.
96. See id.
97. See Peter Csonka, Council of Europe Activities Related to Information Technology,
Data Protection and Computer Crime, 5 INFO. & COMM. TECH. LAW 177, 178 (1996).
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In 1989, the Committee of Ministers98 adopted a recommenda-
tion and report on computer-related crime, Recommendation No. R.
(89) 9.99  The recommendation called on member states to consider
computer crimes when either reviewing or proposing domestic legis-
lation, and the report contained guidelines in this area for legisla-
tors.100  In 1995, the Committee adopted Recommendation No. R.
(95) 13, which provided procedures for implementing Recommenda-
tion (89) 9, and contained principles “concerning problems of crimi-
nal procedure law connected with information technology” on such
topics as search and seizure, technical surveillance, electronic evi-
dence, encryption, and international cooperation.101
In February 1997, a Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyber-
space (PC-CY) was formed to examine computer crime and related
problems in criminal procedure law.102  Its work is aimed at drafting a
binding legal instrument (i.e., a “Cybercrime Convention”) which de-
fines cybercrime offenses, and addresses such topics as jurisdiction,
international cooperation, search and seizure, data protection, and
liability of ISPs.103  The PC-CY first met in April 1997, and has had
several additional meetings.104  The PC-CY expects to have a draft
Convention completed by December 31, 2000, at which time the draft
will be forwarded to the Steering Committee on European Crime
Problems (CDPC) (a committee of senior career bureaucrats).  If the
CDPC approves the draft, it will be forwarded to the Committee of
Ministers for their approval.  After approval by the Committee of
98. The Committee of Ministers is the decision-making organ of the Council of Europe,
which comprises the foreign ministers from the member countries.  (A European Foreign Min-
ister is equivalent in rank to the U.S. Secretary of State.)  See Introduction to the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe (last modified Mar. 22, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/cm/intro/
intro.0.html>.
99. See Csonka, supra note 97, at 179-80.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 186; Recommendation No. R (95) 13 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States Concerning Problems of Criminal Procedure Law Connected with Information Technol-
ogy (last modified Dec. 3, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/crycoe.htm>
(adopted Sept. 11, 1995).
102. While membership of the PC-CY is limited to experts from fourteen European coun-
tries, representatives from the Canada, Japan, and the United States may attend meetings, but
may not vote on any matter.  See Council of Europe’s Fight Against Corruption and Organised
Crime (last modified June 10, 1997) <http://www.coe.fr/corrupt/epccy.htm> (Specific Terms of
Reference, Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyberspace, 583rd Meeting, Feb. 4, 1997).
103. See id.; Telephone Interview with Drew C. Arena, supra note 29.
104. See THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY 69 (May
1998).
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Ministers, the Convention will be open for signature by COE mem-
bers and non-member states which participated in its drafting.105
B. The European Union
The European Union (EU) has its roots in three organizations
formed in the 1950s by Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, and the Netherlands: the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC); the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom); and the European Economic Community (EEC).106
These three communities are still at the heart of the EU, and the
treaties which founded them have since been revised and extended.107
The Treaty on European Union, generally called the Maastricht
Treaty, gives a single legal framework to the three European Com-
munities.108
The EU now has fifteen member states, and its own flag, anthem
and currency (the Euro).109  The EU’s objective is to “promote eco-
nomic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, assert
the European identity on the international scene, and introduce a
European citizenship for the nationals of the Member States.”110
In the area of high-tech crime, the EU has issued several texts.
In 1995, it promulgated a directive which established certain rights
and protections for citizens concerning electronically processed
data.111  For example, the directive establishes the right of a citizen to
know what electronic data a corporation maintains on that person,
and provides protection against personal data being transferred to a
105. See Council of Europe’s Fight Against Corruption and Organised Crime, supra note
102.  If the United States were to become a signatory to the Convention (which is impossible to
predict at this point), the U.S. Senate would have to ratify the Convention, as with any interna-
tional treaty.
106. See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION, CULTURE AND
AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA, EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, HOW DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION
WORK? 6-7 (2d ed. 1998).  The founding treaties have been revised three times: in 1987 (the
Single Act); in 1992 (the Treaty on European Union); and in 1997 (the draft Treaty of Amster-
dam).  See The abc of the European Union - citizenship (last modified Feb. 23, 1999) <http://
europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm>.
107. See The abc of the European Union - citizenship, supra note 106.
108. See id.
109. See id.  The member states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.  See What is the European Union?  15 Member States and Maps (last modified
Feb. 3, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/en/eu/states.htm>.
110. The abc of the European Union - citizenship, supra note 106.
111. See Directive 95/46/EC supra note 56.
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non-EU country if that country has inadequate privacy protections.112
Member states are required to establish mechanisms to enforce these
rights.113  In 1997, the EU  issued a directive designed to ensure pri-
vacy relating to telecommunications data.114  That directive requires
telecommunications carriers to delete traffic data at the end of each
transmission (with exceptions for billing purposes and for law en-
forcement and national security needs).115  In light of these Directives,
it is imperative that government policy decisions concerning elec-
tronic commerce and privacy be made in concert with decisions con-
cerning public safety.
In 1997, the European Council116 endorsed an action plan to
combat organized crime, and assembled a Multidisciplinary Group
on Organized Crime (MDG) to implement the action plan.117  Rec-
ommendation Five of the action plan calls for a study on high-tech
crime, and development of a policy addressing public safety which
provides law enforcement and judicial authorities with the means to
prevent and combat the misuse of new technologies.118  Since its in-
ception, the MDG has adopted the study of Dr. Ulrich Sieber on le-
gal aspects of computer related crime,119 and it is exploring what role
Europol might play in combating computer crime.120
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. The EU has issued a number of other documents relating to crime in cyber-
space.  See, e.g., Decision No. 276/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
January 25, 1999, Official Journal of the European Communities, L33/1 (Feb. 6, 1999)
(adopting an action plan on promoting safer use of the Internet by combating illegal and harm-
ful content on global networks).
116. The European Council is comprised of the heads of state of the fifteen member coun-
tries of the EU.  See The Council of the European Union (last modified Mar. 31, 1998)
<http://europa.eu.int/inst/en/cl.htm#council>.  The Council meets twice a year to provide input
to the European Parlaiment about policy and development of the European Union.  See id.
117. See 2146.Council - Justice and Home Affairs Press Release, Brussels, 03-12-1998, Nr.
13673/98, Presse 427 (visited Mar. 27, 1999) <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/main.cfm?LANG=1>
(Press Release from the 2146th Council Meeting, Council of the European Union, General
Secretariat, Justice and Home Affairs Report on the Follow-Up of the 1997 Action Plan on the
Fight Against Organized Crime).
118. See id.; Telephone Interview with Drew C. Arena, supra note 29.
119. See generally Prof. Dr. Ulrich Sieber, Legal Aspects of Computer-Related Crime in the
Information SocietyCOMCRIME Study, in SPECIAL LAW AND COUNTRY REPORTS (1998).
120. Europol is a European police office created by convention in 1998.  Located at The
Hague, Europol is an information clearing house and analysis center with law enforcement liai-
son officers from the member states.  Europol is not a European police force; its mandate is to
increase cooperation and communication between and among law enforcement agencies in the
member states.  See Telephone Interview with Drew C. Arena, supra note 29.
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C. The G-8
1. Background.  The present G-8 (or “Group of Eight”)
leading industrialized democracies originated in 1975 at an Economic
Summit convened by President Valery Giscard d’Estaing of France
and attended by leaders from Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom
and the United States.121  President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt
of Germany wanted to establish an informal forum for world leaders
to discuss world economic issues.122  Italy and Canada joined this
original “Group of Five” in 1976-77 and the configuration became
known as the Group of Seven, or “G-7.”123  G-7 meetings followed a
limited agenda of economic issues, and were intended to provide an
informal consultation forum.124  In the 1980s, these annual meetings
became more formalized, with an agreed statement, or communique,
issued by the leaders at the conclusion of each summit.125  Leaders
such as President Reagan, French President Mitterand, German
Chancellor Kohl, and British Prime Minister Thatcher brought
increasingly broader agendas to the table.126  At the end of the cold
war, as democratic and economic reform got underway in Russia,
Russian leaders were gradually integrated into the G-7.127  In 1998,
the group’s name was formally changed to the “G-8,” and the first
full G-8 Summit was held in Birmingham in June of that year.128
In its current configuration, the G-8’s membership includes the
majority of the world’s most powerful democracies—countries that
are global leaders economically, technologically, legally, and politi-
cally.  This small but powerful membership gives the G-8 certain ad-
121. See What is G8? (visited Mar. 27, 1999) <http://birmingham.g8summit.gov.uk/brief
0398/what.is.g8.shtml> (the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office web page for the 1998
Birmingham Summit).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.  For example, the 1983 Williamsburg Summit, hosted by President Reagan,
produced a G-7 agreement to support the deployment of U.S. Cruise and Pershing missiles to
Europe to confront new Soviet SS20 missiles. Agreement on common opposition to global ter-
rorism followed at the Tokyo Summit in 1986.  See id.
126. See What is G8?, supra note 121.
127. See id.  Former President Gorbachev attended a meeting in the margins of the London
Summit in 1991.  Likewise, in 1992 and 1993, President Yeltsin was invited to Summits to dis-
cuss financial assistance to the Russian economy, and in 1994 President Yeltsin first took part
in foreign policy discussions.  The Denver Summit in 1997 was called the “Summit of the
Eight,” in recognition of broader Russian involvement.  See id.
128. See id.; Richard W. Stevenson, Rich Leaders Turn Eye to Crime and Debt, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1998, at A11.
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vantages over more bureaucratic or cumbersome multilateral organi-
zations.129
2. Focus on High-tech Crime.  After the 1995 Summit in
Halifax, Nova Scotia, a group of experts was brought together to look
for better ways to fight international crime.  In 1996 this group
(which became known as the “Lyon Group”) produced forty
recommendations to combat international crime130 that were
endorsed by the G-8 heads of state at the Lyon Summit in June 1996.
Recommendation Sixteen, in part, called for countries to “review
their laws in order to ensure that abuses of modern technology that
are deserving of criminal sanctions are criminalized and that
problems with respect to jurisdiction, enforcement powers,
investigation, training, crime prevention and international
cooperation in respect of such abuses are effectively addressed.”131
To implement Recommendation Sixteen and otherwise enhance
the abilities of  law enforcement in combating high-tech and com-
puter-related crime,  a subgroup of the Lyon Group was formed in
January 1997 (“G-8 Subgroup on High-tech Crime”), and it held its
first five meetings during that year.132  In December 1997, Attorney
General Reno hosted the first-ever meeting of her counterparts from
the G-8 countries, and the meeting centered on computer crime.133
At the conclusion of the meeting, the Ministers134 adopted ten Princi-
ples and a ten-point Action Plan to combat high-tech crime, and is-
sued a Communiqué.135  At the 1998 G-8 Summit in Birmingham,
129. “Our small number allows us to act quickly, and our unique membership offers an op-
portunity to lead the world community that is rarely found in our history.  And we are often on
the cutting edge for example in responding to international terrorism, to international money
laundering, to precursor chemicals.”  Reno, Chantilly Keynote Address, supra note 1.
130. See G8 and International Crime (visited Mar. 27, 1999) <http://birmingham.g8summit.
gov.uk/crime/>.
131. P8 Senior Experts Group on Transnational Organized Crime, P8 Senior Experts
Group Recommendations 3 (Apr. 12, 1996) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative &
International Law) (the P8 Senior Experts Group is also known as the Lyon Group).
132. See Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) (last modified Nov. 24,
1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/intl.html>.
133. See id.
134. “Ministers” is a convention that refers to the law enforcement heads from the G-8
countries, the majority of which are either Ministers of Justice or Ministers of the Interior.
135. The full text of the Principles and Action Plan adopted by the Ministers follows:
PRINCIPLES AND ACTION PLAN TO COMBAT HIGH-TECH CRIME
Statement of Principles
We hereby endorse the following PRINCIPLES, which should be supported by all
countries:
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I.  There must be no safe havens for those who abuse information technologies.
II.  Investigation and prosecution of international high-tech crimes must be coordi-
nated among all concerned States, regardless of where harm has occurred.
III.  Law enforcement personnel must be trained and equipped to address high-tech
crimes.
IV.  Legal systems must protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data
and systems from unauthorized impairment and ensure that serious abuse is penal-
ized.
V.  Legal systems should permit the preservation of and quick access to electronic
data, which are often critical to the successful investigation of crime.
VI.  Mutual assistance regimes must ensure the timely gathering and exchange of evi-
dence in cases involving international high-tech crime.
VII.  Transborder electronic access by law enforcement to publicly available (open
source) information does not require authorization from the State where the data re-
sides.
VIII.  Forensic standards for retrieving and authenticating electronic data for use in
criminal investigations and prosecutions must be developed and employed.
IX.  To the extent practicable, information and telecommunications systems should be
designed to help prevent and detect network abuse, and should also facilitate the
tracing of criminals and the collection of evidence.
X.  Work in this area should be coordinated with the work of other relevant interna-
tional fora to ensure against duplication of efforts.
Communique Annex: Principles to Combat High-Tech Crime (last modified Mar. 30, 1998)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/principles.htm>.
Action Plan
In support of these PRINCIPLES, we are directing our officials to:
1.  Use our established network of knowledgeable personnel to ensure a timely, effec-
tive response to transnational high-tech cases and designate a point-of-contact who is
available on a twenty-four hour basis.
2.  Take appropriate steps to ensure that a sufficient number of trained and equipped
law enforcement personnel are allocated to the task of combating high-tech crime and
assisting law enforcement agencies of other States.
3.  Review our legal systems to ensure that they appropriately criminalize abuses of
telecommunications and computer systems and promote the investigation of high-tech
crimes.
4.  Consider issues raised by high-tech crimes, where relevant, when negotiating mu-
tual assistance agreements or arrangements.
5.  Continue to examine and develop workable solutions regarding: the preservation
of evidence prior to the execution of a request for mutual assistance; transborder
searches; and computer searches of data where the location of that data is unknown.
6.  Develop expedited procedures for obtaining traffic data from all communications
carriers in the chain of a communication and to study ways to expedite the passing of
this data internationally.
7.  Work jointly with industry to ensure that new technologies facilitate our effort to
combat high-tech crime by preserving and collecting critical evidence.
8.  Ensure that we can, in urgent and appropriate cases, accept and respond to mutual
assistance requests relating to high-tech crime by expedited but reliable means of
communications, including voice, fax, or e-mail, with written confirmation to follow
where required.
9.  Encourage internationally-recognized standards-making bodies in the fields of
telecommunications and information technologies to continue providing the public
and private sectors with standards for reliable and secure telecommunications and
data processing technologies.
10.  Develop and employ compatible forensic standards for retrieving and authenti-
cating electronic data for use in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
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England, the Heads of State endorsed and agreed to implement their
Ministers’ Principles and Action Plan.136  Essentially an international
template for fighting high-tech crime, the Principles and Action Plan
have been adopted by President Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, French President Jacques Chirac, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin, and the other G-8 leaders.  This is quite significant. It is the
first time a group of powerful world leaders have jointly adopted a
detailed plan for fighting computer crime.137  Additionally, instead of
referring the plan back to member countries for individual action, a
subgroup of G-8 experts meets regularly to work cooperatively to-
ward implementation of the Action Plan.
3. High-tech Crime Subgroup.  As of May 1999, the G-8
Subgroup on High-tech Crime had met fourteen times.138  Its focus
has been on enhancing the abilities of law enforcement to investigate
and prosecute high-tech and computer-related crime.  The
Subgroup’s progress and accomplishments include the following:
a. High-tech Points of Contact.  In March 1998, a network of
high-tech points of contact for law enforcement in each of the G-8
countries was established.139  These contacts are available twenty-four
hours a day to respond to urgent requests for assistance in
international high-tech crime investigations or cases involving
electronic evidence.140  Recruitment and education efforts are
currently underway to expand this network to include many more
Internet-connected countries.  The hope is that in the near future,
international investigations in this area will not be delayed because of
the inability to locate the proper computer crime expert or because
of differences in time zones.141
b. International Training Conference.  In November 1998, the
Subgroup hosted an international computer crime training
conference for G-8 law enforcement officials.142  The conference,
Communique Annex: Action Plan to Combat High-Tech Crime (last modified Mar. 30, 1998)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/action.htm>.
136. See The Birmingham Summit: Final Communique, ¶ 21 (visited Mar. 30, 1999)
<http://birmingham. g8summit.gov.uk/docs/final.shtml>.  The Final Communique was estab-
lished May 17, 1998.  See id.; see also Stevenson, supra note 128; Susan Page, Trade and Crime
Were Also on Agenda, USA TODAY, May 18, 1998, at 15A.
137. The forty recommendations and the principles on high-tech crime agreed to in 1997
have recently been endorsed by the EU.  In addition, the UN is considering changes to its
model treaty on mutual legal assistance reflecting the work being carried out by the G-8.  See
G8 and International Crime, supra note 130.
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which focused on technical and operational issues, allowed
cybercrime experts to share knowledge regarding the latest trends
and techniques of high-tech criminals, the technical problems
encountered in high-tech investigations, and law enforcement
solutions.  This was the first such conference, and the participants
expressed unanimous support for similar future conferences.143
c. Review of Legal Systems.  The Subgroup is in the process of
comparing each country’s legal system as it relates to high-tech
crime.144  The project covers substantive and procedural laws, data
protection and privacy, search and seizure law, extradition, electronic
surveillance (wiretapping), and abilities to secure traffic data
(connection information) and subscriber information.145  This is an
important step for the G-8 to take to ensure that the member
countries’ legal systems appropriately criminalize computer crimes
and promote their investigation.
d. Locating and Identifying Computer Criminals (“Preserva-
tion of Traffic Data”).  Substantial energy has been devoted to this
critical topic, which includes access to historical traffic data and
future (“real-time”) traffic data.  As a first step in this area, principles
for transborder access to stored computer data have been adopted.146
e. Principles for Transborder Searches and Seizures.  The
Subgroup reached a consensus on principles for transborder access to
stored computer data.147  Among other things, the principles include
“fast freeze” recommendations on preserving data in anticipation of
a formal request for mutual legal assistance, as well as on expedited
processing of formal legal assistance requests.  The principles also
obligate states to ensure that their national laws and procedures
permit them to secure rapid preservation of stored data in a
138. Telephone Interview with Scott Charney, Chief, Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section, U.S. Department of Justice and Chair, G-8 Subgroup on High-tech Crime
(May 7, 1999).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Telephone Interview with Scott Charney, supra note 138.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.e.
147. Telephone Interview with Scott Charney, supra note 138.
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computer system, even where necessary only to assist a foreign state;
endorse some forms of consensual access; and affirm that no
authorization from a searched state is required for transborder access
to publicly available data.148  These principles are only
recommendations on interim measures, and it is too early in the
process to know if complicated issues concerning transborder
searches and seizures can be resolved sufficiently to allow for their
implementation.149
f. Computer Forensics.  In recognition of the fact that the
International Organization of Computer Evidence (IOCE) has broad
representation that includes most of the G-8 countries, the Subgroup,
through its Chair, referred to the IOCE the task of developing
recommendations for international standards on the retrieval and
authentication of electronic evidence.150  The first step for the IOCE
will be defining common terms, identifying methods and techniques
to be used, and establishing a common format for forensics
requests.151
g. Cooperation with Industry.  The Subgroup has followed the
instruction of the G-8 Heads of State at their Summit in May 1998 for
close cooperation with industry.152  Representatives from hardware
manufacturers, telecommunications carriers, and ISPs have made
presentations at meetings, and have discussed concrete steps law
enforcement and industry can take together to accelerate
cooperation between the two.153
On going Subgroup work concerning industry includes the fol-
lowing: adopting a process that allows the companies that are devel-
oping technical standards, including next-generation Internet tech-
nologies, to take into account public safety needs; consulting within
governments to ensure that new data protection policies do not pro-
vide havens for criminals; standardizing law enforcement requests for
assistance to industry, in order to allow industry to respond more
quickly and with less expense; and developing twenty-four-hour
points-of-contact with critical ISPs.  In addition, plans are underway
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See The Birmingham Summit: Final Communique, supra note 136.
153. These representatives have included America Online (American ISP), NiftyServe
(Japanese ISP), and Deutsche Telekom (German telecommunications carrier and ISP).
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for a G-8 industry conference on high-tech crime which would bring
together high-tech crime-fighters and private sector representatives
from the G-8 countries.154
D. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)
The OECD is an organization of twenty-nine countries that pro-
vides member-governments with a forum to develop economic and
social policy.155  It was formed by convention in 1961 by twenty coun-
tries in North America and Western Europe, and since then its mem-
bership has been joined by Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Finland,
Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Korea.156  Mem-
bership is limited to countries which are committed to a market
economy and pluralistic democracy.157  Most work is done in one of
the OECD’s 200 committees, working groups, and expert groups, and
over 40,000 government officials participate in OECD meetings each
year.  The OECD has a permanent secretariat in Paris, and the
United States (like other nations) has an ambassador posted to the
OECD.158
The OECD has developed and issued a number of documents
related to computers and cyberspace.  “Guidelines on the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data” were adopted in
1980.159  The Guidelines were intended “to harmonise national pri-
vacy legislation and . . . to prevent at the same time interruptions in
international flows of data.”160  “Guidelines for the Security of Infor-
mation Systems” were adopted in 1992.161  These guidelines were in-
tended to raise awareness of risks to information systems and to pro-
vide reassurance as to the reliability of information systems.
Governments and the private sector were urged to cooperate to cre-
154. Telephone Interview with Scott Charney, supra note 138.
155. See About OECD: What is OECD? (last modified Mar. 26, 1999) <http://www.oecd.
org/about/general/ index.htm>.
156. See About OECD: Membership (last modified Mar. 26, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/
about/general/member-countries.htm>.
157. See About OECD: What is OECD?, supra note 155.
158. See id.
159. See Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
(last modified Mar. 26, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org//dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.HTM>.
160. Id.
161. See Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems (last modified Mar. 26, 1999)
<http://www.oecd.org//dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/e_secur.htm>.
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ate an international framework for security of information systems.162
In 1997, the OECD issued Cryptography Policy Guidelines and the
Report on Background and Issues of Cryptography Policy.163
E. The United Nations
The United Nations is planning to increase awareness of com-
puter crime issues by sponsoring a workshop on “Crimes Related to
the Computer Network” at the Tenth United Congress on Crime
Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders, scheduled to be held in
Vienna in April 2000.164  At the request of the Centre for Interna-
tional Crime Prevention in Vienna, the United Nations Asia Far
Eastern Institute (UNAFEI) has assumed responsibility for coordi-
nating the workshop.
In October 1998, UNAFEI hosted an experts meeting in Fuchu,
Tokyo to begin preparations for this workshop.  The group of ex-
perts, including representatives from Australia, Canada, India, the
Netherlands, Japan, Korea, South Africa and the United States, are
planning a workshop program that will demonstrate the legal and
technical difficulties of tracking criminal activities over computer
networks as well as the problems associated with searching and seiz-
ing evidence stored on computer networks.  In addition, negotiations
are currently underway on a UN Convention on transnational or-
ganized crime.  It is likely that certain aspects of cybercrime will be
addressed by the Convention.165
V. CONCLUSION
Criminality deriving from new technologies such as computers,
the Internet, and wireless communications provides daunting chal-
lenges for law enforcement around the globe.  Crimes can be commit-
ted remotely, without the criminal ever setting foot in the country
where the misdeed occurs or the victim is located.  Critical evidence
may vanish the moment the culprit ends his transmission.  And any
hacker can route his communication through a foreign country,
thereby adding an international element to his crime which may cre-
ate insurmountable obstacles for law enforcement. Since the United
162. See id.
163. See Cryptography Policy: The Guidelines and the Issues (last modified Mar. 26, 1999)
<http://www.oecd.org//dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/e-crypto.htm>.
164. See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1997/52 of December 1997.
165. Telephone Interview with Greg Schaffer, Trial Attorney, Computer Crime and Intel-
lectual Property Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (March 8, 1999).
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States depends on the stable, consistent operation of such critical in-
frastructures as banking, telecommunications, and emergency serv-
ices—all of which have become increasingly automated—the stakes
facing the public are quite high indeed.
Although law enforcement officials are loath to admit that any
criminal has the upper hand, candid professionals acknowledge that
they face an uphill battle in this arena. As technologies evolve, laws
need updating so that international legal assistance can be provided,
and criminals can be extradited and brought to justice.  Countries
must dedicate more experts to high-tech crime-fighting, and then
provide them with the sophisticated and expensive equipment re-
quired for their tasks.  The ability to locate and identify criminals
must be improved dramatically, although it sometimes seems beyond
the limits of existing technologies.  And various issues posed by the
need to gather electronic evidence of a crime from several coun-
tries—often in real-time—must be resolved.  As a result, the ultimate
outcome of this struggle to maintain public safety in our increasingly
automated way of life is far from certain.
Many important steps have been taken in this regard by individ-
ual governments, and ambitious efforts are also underway in the in-
ternational community.  But so much more needs to be done.  At
every level, there must be a heightened appreciation of the threat
posed by international high-tech and computer-related crime.  Senior
government officials have to provide leadership, be receptive to new
ways of thinking, and come to understand that many of the old para-
digms for crime-fighting  no longer suffice.
Finally, these challenges cannot be met unless a true partnership
between governments and the private sector comes into being.  Pol-
icy-makers and law enforcement officials must recognize that law en-
forcement needs may place burdens on industry, which they should
take reasonable steps to minimize.  At the same time, industry ought
to consider the safety of the public when responding to the needs of
the market.
As we begin a new millennium, governments must work together
to stay ahead of this next generation of criminal activity.  They can-
not allow cyberspace to become the new Wild West—a frontier be-
reft of the rule of law, where criminals prey on citizens with impunity.
We must not permit the many benefits of the information age—such
as electronic commerce and enhanced communications—to be seri-
ously diminished by their vulnerability to illegal activity.
